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EARLS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
A TIMID ATTEMPT TO LIMIT
SPECIAL NEEDS FROM BECOMING
NOTHING SPECIAL
DAVID BADANESt
INTRODUCTION
In Earls v. Board of Education,l the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the suspicionless drug testing of public
school students participating in extracurricular activities was
unconstitutional. 2 The Tecumseh School District in Tecumseh,
Oklahoma implemented a policy that required students
participating in extracurricular activities to submit to urine drug
testing, regardless of any suspicion that a particular student was
using illegal drugs.3 Two students challenged the testing policy
on the grounds that it violated the Fourth Amendment. 4 The
school district defended the policy asserting that the drug testing
was constitutional under the "special needs" doctrine5 developed
by the Supreme Court.6 In contrast to the Tenth Circuit, other
courts of appeals have held that similar drug testing schemes
are constitutional.7 Furthermore, in 1995, the Supreme Court
t J.D. Candidate 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., SUNY at
Stony Brook.
1 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
2 See id. at 1278 (finding that the school district must demonstrate "some
identifiable drug use problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the
testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its drug
problem").
3 See id. at 1267 ("Each student seeking to participate in such activities must
sign a written consent agreeing to submit to drug testing prior to participating in
the activity, randomly during the year while participating. .. .") (emphasis added).
4 See id. at 1268.
5 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
6 See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1269.
7 See Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, No.
98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999); see also Joy v.
Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 2000); Todd v.
Rush County Sch. Corp., 133 F.3d 984, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit
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upheld a testing program that required student athletes to
undergo suspicionless drug testing.8
This Comment agrees with the Earls court that the
Tecumseh School District's testing policy was unconstitutional.
It argues, however, that the rationale of the Earls court was
erroneous and its analysis and application of the facts too timid.
Furthermore, this Comment contends that the special needs
doctrine deserves judicial clarification so that it may remain a
limited exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Comment briefly outlines the United States
Supreme Court cases that established the contours and scope of
the special needs doctrine. It also examines some of the
dissenting opinions and scholarly criticisms of the special needs
doctrine. Part II discusses and analyzes the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in Earls. Finally, Part III suggests a more cogent special
needs test.
I. ESTABLISHING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
affords the American populace protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures conducted by the government.9 The full
text of the Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 10
Both scholars and the Supreme Court have debated the
exact meaning and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."
in Joy declared that if the case were reviewed solely on the basis of recent Supreme
Court precedent, it would have found the policy unconstitutional. See Joy, 212 F.3d
at 1063. The "doctrines of stare decisis and precedent," however, required the court
to follow its holding in Todd and declare the policy constitutional. Id.
8 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has "focused on the
relationship between the reasonableness requirement and the warrant
requirement"); George M. Dery, I, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than
Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth
Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998); see also
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In recent years, the Court has seemingly settled upon the
general rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if it
is not authorized by a valid warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion.12 Yet, the Court has carved out a
limited number of exceptions to this general rule and has
allowed some searches in the absence of either a warrant or
individualized suspicion.13
The Court has also announced that a search is reasonable
when an important governmental need, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, makes the warrant and probable cause
requirements impracticable, and the government's interest
outweighs the individual's privacy interest.14 In essence, this
describes the special needs doctrine.15 The genesis of the special
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Olur
jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone."); Michael E. Brewer, Comment,
Chandler v. Miller. No Turning Back from a Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
Analysis, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 275, 279 (1997); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, 'Special
Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant
Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1997); Melinda Wyatt
Gilliam, Comment, Oklahoma Constitutional Law: The Future of the Fourth
Amendment in Oklahoma High Schools, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000); Robert S.
Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology for
"Special Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 449 (2000); Jennifer E. Smiley,
Comment, Rethinking the "Special Needs" Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of
High School Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 811, 812-13 (2001); Peter A. Veytsman, Comment, Drug Testing Student
Athletes and Fourth Amendment Privacy: The Legal Aftermath ofVernonia v. Acton,
73 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 298 (2000). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE §§ 1.1, 1.3 (3d ed. 1996) (treatise on the Fourth Amendment).
12 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001) (declaring "the
general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not
authorized by a valid warrant"); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (2000)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment imposes a "restraint on government
conduct [which] generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989) (observing that prior Supreme Court "cases indicate that even a search that
may be performed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on
probable cause to believe that the person to be searched has violated the law");
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (explaining that
even if probable cause is not required, "some quantum of individualized suspicion"
remains necessary before a search is reasonable).
13 See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(upholding alcohol testing at roadside checkpoints); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
545 (allowing brief detentions for questioning of individuals at international border
crossings).
14 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
15 As one scholar points out, however, the Supreme Court has not "adequately
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needs doctrine was Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 16
In T.L.O., the Court held that public school officials are
agents of the government, and therefore searches of
schoolchildren conducted by school officials must comport with
the Fourth Amendment. 17 Nonetheless, the Court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment does not require school officials to
"obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
authority." 8 The Court reasoned that the warrant requirement
is unsuited to the school environment, as it "would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."19 Instead of a
warrant requirement, the Court substituted a balancing test this
weighs the government's interests in conducting the warrantless
search against the individual's privacy interests. 20 Additionally,
in a school setting, the probable cause requirement may be
eschewed so long as there is a reasonable belief that the
warrantless search will be fruitful in discovering a violation of
either the law or the rules of the school.21 Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, however, asserted that the balancing test
should be the exception, not the rule.22 He also stated that
"[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers."23
defined what a 'special need'... is." Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized
Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 261
(2000).
16 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17 See id. at 333.
18 Id. at 340 (indicating that it would 'Trustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search") (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
19 Id.
20 See id. at 337 (weighing the government's interest against the individual's
interest and stating that reasonableness is determined by "balancing the need to
search against the invasion" upon which the search intrudes) (quoting Camara, 387
U.S. at 532-33); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968) (discussing the
necessity of a balancing test).
21 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
22 See id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (clarifying that probable cause
is not necessary when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence).
23 Id. at 351.
[Vol.75:693
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Subsequent to the T.L.O. decision, the Court has repeatedly
applied the special needs doctrine.24 The Court has found special
needs to exist in situations as diverse as: searches of a
government employee's office, 25 administrative inspections of an
automobile salvage yard,26 and searches of a probationer's
apartment upon the belief that there might be weapons on the
premises.27
The Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
government may conduct suspicionless drug testing of
individuals in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.28 In
Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) enacted
regulations mandating blood and urine analysis for any
employees involved in train accidents which resulted in "(i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an
evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad
property of $500,000 or more."29 The drug testing did not require
any level of suspicion that a particular employee had been under
the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the accident.3 0
The Court found that the government's concern for safe rail
transportation presented the requisite special need.3 1
Ultimately, the balancing test conducted by the Court led to the
conclusion that the government's interests in safe rail
transportation overshadowed the individual's privacy rights;
therefore, the FRA regulations were constitutional.32 In its
decision, the Court affirmed that the testing did constitute a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 33 The Court reasoned
24 See Dodson, supra note 15, at 263.
2 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
26 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
27 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-76 (1987).
28 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
29 Id. at 609.
30 See id. at 609-12 (describing the regulations). An employee who refused to
provide the required blood or urine samples would have his duties restricted for
nine months. Id. at 610-11.
31 See id. at 620 (indicating that the government's interest in ensuring safety is
a special need justifying departures from the ordinary warrant procedures and
probable cause requirements).
32 See id. at 633 (stating that such a test "is not an undue infringement" on the
privacy of employees).
33 See id. at 617 ("Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we
agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
20011
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that under the facts presented in the case, however, there was no
constitutional requirement for individualized suspicion;34 but, it
emphasized that this requirement would be dispensed with only
"in limited circumstances." 35
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,36 the
United States Customs Service implemented a suspicionless
drug testing regime as a condition to applying for certain
employment positions.37 The policy required all employees who
held positions that had a direct involvement in drug interdiction
or that required the individual to carry firearms or handle
classified material38 to submit a urine sample for drug testing.39
The government identified two special needs: to ensure that
front-line interdiction personnel had unimpeachable integrity
and judgment,40 and that employees who carried firearms were
drug-free.41 Here, as in Skinner, the necessity for individualized
suspicion was dispensed with on the theory that the government
had a need to discover "latent" or "hidden" drug use.42 The Court
ruled that the requirement was constitutional. 43
A perceived drug problem in public schools led to the
expansion of suspicionless drug testing policy in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton.44 The Vernonia School District drug
testing policy required all students who wished to participate in
extracurricular athletics to submit to a random, suspicionless
drug-testing program.45 In Acton, the Court identified a special
Amendment.").
34 See id. at 624. The Court explained that it has "usually required 'some
quantum of individualized suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable,"
but "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which
a search must be presumed unreasonable." Id. In support of its decision, the Court
noted substantial findings by the FRA that alcohol and drug use were a frequent
cause of train accidents. Id. at 606-07.
35 Id. at 624.
36 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
37 See id. at 660-61.
38 See id. The Court remanded to the lower court for reconsideration the part of
the policy that applied to positions involving the handling of classified material. See
id. at 664-65.
39 See id. at 661 (describing the collection process).
40 See id. at 670. The government further justified the special need on the
grounds that employees had to be physically fit. Id.
41 See id. at 670-71.
42 Id. at 668.
43 See id. at 677.
44 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
45 See id. at 649-50 (describing the policy).
[Vol.75:693
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need based on a variety of factors.46 The Court reasoned that a
warrant requirement "would unduly interfere" with the school's
disciplinary functions and that a probable cause requirement
would impede the "substantial need" of the school system to
"maintain order in the schools." 47 Having found a special need,
the Court applied a balancing test, weighing the government's
interests against the students' privacy interest.48
In dicta, the Court noted that the government's interests
need not be compelling, rather, they must be important enough
"to justify the particular search at hand."49 According to the
Court, the government's interest in deterring drug use among
schoolchildren was certainly important.50 This interest was
reinforced by the fact that school officials served a "custodial and
tutelary" purpose and that a "proper educational environment
requires close supervision of schoolchildren."51
In comparison with the government's interest, the Court
found the students' privacy interests to be minimal.52  Three
factors were utilized to assess the students' privacy interest.53
The first factor was the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the search intruded.54 According to the Court, only
"legitimate" privacy expectations are protected by the Fourth
Amendment.55 The Court stated the proposition that "students
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the general population."56
46 See id. at 653 (adopting Justice Blackmun's statement in T.L.O.).
47 Id.
48 See id. at 654-57.
49 Id. at 660-61 (contending that although the Court in "Skinner and Von Raab
[had] .. . characterized the government interest motivating the search as
'compelling'", it would be incorrect to dispose of a case with a simple finding that a
compelling state interest did not exist).
50 See id. at 661-62 (explaining that the deterrence of drug use among
schoolchildren also helps to protect the entire educational process).
51 Id. at 655.
52 See id. at 656-57 (reasoning that students, and student athletes in
particular, have a lesser expectation of privacy).
53 See id. at 654-60.
54 See id. at 654.
65 Id. The Court added that the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy may
vary depending upon the context in which the individual is asserting the right. Id.
66 I. at 657. The Court reasoned that the individual's legal relationship with
the State affected the expectation of privacy. Id. Because schoolchildren are in the
"temporary custody of the State," they possess a lower expectation of privacy. Id.
Moreover, "Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere." Id. at 656.
20011
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Furthermore, student athletes have an even lower privacy
expectation, in part, because athletes must undress and shower
in a public locker room.5 7 The Court concluded that students
who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to
expect intrusions upon their privacy rights.58
The second factor concerned the nature of the intrusion.59
This factor consisted of two components: the collection process
itself and the information disclosed concerning the contents of
the human body.60 The Court described the urination collection
procedure as "nearly identical to those typically encountered in
public restrooms," and therefore, found it to be a negligible
intrusion upon privacy interests.61  As for the information
disclosed, the tests were limited to detecting the presence of
drugs and not other sensitive data.62 Additionally, the results of
the tests were only disclosed to a limited number of school
personnel and not turned over to any law enforcement agency.63
In the Court's evaluation, this component was also not a
significant invasion of privacy.6
The last factor considered concerned the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of the
government's means for addressing it.65 The Court held the
nature of the governmental concern to be important, especially
since the drug testing program was narrowly tailored towards
school athletics.66 The Court believed the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug users or their fellow athletes was
57 See id. at 657 (pointing out that "[s]chool sports are not for the bashful"). The
Court also noted that student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy
because they "voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation." Id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 658.
60 See id. The Court also stated that it was insignificant whether medical
information was disclosed prior to, or after, the urine samples were gathered. Id. at
659.
61 Id. at 658.
62 See id. (explaining that the drug tests do not detect whether the student is
"epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic"). But see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn,
489 U.S. 602, 647 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that drug tests can now
"uncover not only drug or alcohol use, but also medical disorders such as epilepsy,
diabetes, and clinical depression").
63 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658. The school also did not impose punishment on
students because of test results. Id.
64 See id. at 660.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 661-62. The Court also cited some general detrimental effects of
drug use by young adults. Id. at 662.
700 [Vol.75:693
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particularly high.67 The Court also found that due to the "state
of rebellion" that was "fueled by... drug abuse," the school
district had an immediate problem that needed to be
addressed.68 According to the Court it was "self-evident" that the
drug testing program was an efficient means to curb drug abuse
among student athletes. 69 The Court ruled that the three factor
test was met, and therefore held the school district's drug testing
policy constitutional.70
Although the Court found suspicionless drug testing
constitutional under the Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton fact
patterns, subsequent decisions have shown that there are some
areas where such testing is invalid. In Chandler v. Miller,71 the
Court held unconstitutional the suspicionless drug testing of
candidates for specific elected offices.72 In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,7 3 a drug testing policy was deemed unconstitutional
because the special need identified was too thoroughly
intertwined with law enforcement.74
In Chandler, the Court was confronted with a state statute
that mandated drug testing of candidates running for specified
state offices.75 The Court's analysis stated that in order to
override the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion, the alleged special need must be
substantial. 76 The Court indicated that in each alleged special
needs case, the "courts must undertake a context-specific
inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties."7 7 Although the Court did not
explicitly mention the three factors used in Acton, it indirectly
67 See id.
68 Id. at 662-63. But see id. at 684-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether there was a demonstrated drug problem in the school district);
Respondent's Brief at 2, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (No.
94-590) (disagreeing with the government's contention that the drug abuse problem
was severe; and claiming that "there is little evidence of Vernonia students using
drugs, and no evidence of any athlete in Vernonia ever competing while on drugs").
69 Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
70 See id. at 664-65.
71 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
72 See id. at 308-09.
73 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
74 See id. at 84-86.
75 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308.
76 See id. at 318.
77 Id. at 314.
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discussed the same issues.78 The Court articulated that the
testing method authorized by the state was "relatively
noninvasive," implying that the first two prongs of the Acton test
were satisfied. 79 The government, however, did not present any
evidence of drug usage by political candidates-undercutting any
justification that the policy was necessary to contain an
immediate problem.80 Finally, the particular testing parameters
were not efficient and "not well designed to identify candidates
who violate antidrug laws."81  Since there was neither an
immediate problem, nor an efficient policy, the third part of the
Acton test was found to be non-existent by the Court.82 As for
the government's interest, the Court reasoned that since public
officials do not perform functions that could jeopardize public
safety, the importance of the government's interest was
diminished.8 3
In Ferguson, a case that was decided on the same day as
Earls,4 a state hospital85 developed a policy that required drug
testing of certain maternity patients.8 6 Central to the ruling was
the fact that if the patient's test revealed evidence of drug use,
the results could be sent directly to law enforcement officials and
the patient could be subject to immediate arrest.87 The Court
held that what distinguished Ferguson from earlier special needs
78 See id. at 318-21 (analyzing the testing method, the lack of a documented
drug problem among candidates, and the government's interest).
79 Id. at 318.
80 See id. at 318-19.
81 Id. at 319. According to the Court, the drug testing procedures were designed
in such a way that a candidate would have sufficient notice to abstain from taking
drugs in preparation for a scheduled test date. Id. at 319-20.
82 See id. at 320.
83 See id. at 321-22.
84 Both case were decided on March 21, 2001. See Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001); Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1265 (10th
Cir. 2001).
85 As a state-owned institution, the members of the hospital were agents of the
government and were therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment. See Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 76 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335-37 (1985)).
86 See id. at 70-73 (detailing the policy guidelines which would trigger the
mandatory drug testing of a maternity patient).
87 See id. The policy did distinguish between discovery of drug use during
pregnancy-in which case law enforcement was to be notified only upon the
patient's testing positive a second time-and discovery of drug use after labor-in
which case law enforcement would be notified immediately. In practice, however,
any initial positive tests were immediately reported to law enforcement. See id. at
72 & n.5.
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cases was that the asserted special need was too entangled with
law enforcement.88 The Court also noted that unauthorized
dissemination of a patient's diagnostic tests is a "far more
substantial" invasion of privacy than what existed in the earlier
special needs cases.8 9  Significantly, the Court affirmed
Chandler's holding that courts must closely scrutinize the
government's alleged special need.90 The Ferguson court also
rejected the viewpoint that "any nonconsensual suspicionless
search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by
defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than
immediate, purpose."91
A. The Special Needs Doctrine Only Applies in Limited
Circumstances
The special needs doctrine is an exception to the general
warrant and probable cause requirements. 92 Recent Supreme
Court cases have used the special needs doctrine only in the
context of drug testing.93 In these cases, the Court has either
limited its application to the specific facts presented or rejected
entirely the use of the doctrine.94 The foregoing demonstrates
the Court's recognition that the special needs doctrine should
remain a limited one.
The dearth of cases in which the Court has invoked the
special needs doctrine supports the inference that the doctrine is
88 See id. at 78-79.
89 Id. at 78 (distinguishing the effects of disseminating a patient's test
information to a third party from the effects of an adverse test result on someone
applying for a voluntary benefit).
9D See id. at 81.
91 Id. at 84 (calling such an approach "inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment"). The government had tried to justify the drug-testing program by
stating that its ultimate purpose was to protect the health of pregnant women. Id.
at 81.
92 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
93 See Smiley, supra note 11, at 827.
94 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 (deciding that the lower court's ruling should be
reversed on the issue of special needs); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997)
(limiting the decision in Von Raab to its unique facts and holding that the special
needs doctrine did not apply); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (clarifying that in her opinion the decision was
limited to student athletes); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
634 (1989) (deciding only that the specific regulations are constitutional); see also id.
at 636 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority was attempting to
limit its opinion to "safety-sensitive jobs").
2001]
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only applicable in exceptional situations.95 Further confirmation
for this proposition can be found in the majority's opinion in
Acton, where they warned "against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster
in other contexts."96
In Chandler, the Court characterized the special needs
doctrine as representing "particularized exceptions to the main
rule."97 Significantly, Chandler also limited the Von Raab
decision, stating that it was "[h]ardly a decision opening broad
vistas for suspicionless searches, [rather,] Von Raab must be
read in its unique context."98 Additionally, Chandler imposed a
higher standard for special needs by stating that the special
need must be substantial. 99 Ferguson confirmed Chandler and
reiterated that an alleged special need must be analyzed to
determine if it "fit[s] within the closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."100
The Court has been very consistent in its position that the
special needs doctrine is the exception to the main interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment.' 10  Arguably, the decisions in
Chandler and Ferguson can be interpreted as indicating the
Court's intention to more strictly limit the application of the
special needs doctrine.
B. Criticisms of the Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs doctrine has been highly criticized. 10 2
95 Since 1987, when Justice Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O. established the
special needs doctrine, there have been only eight cases in which the Supreme Court
has used the doctrine as the basis for its holding. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79;
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318; Acton, 515 U.S. at 653; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Natl
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702
(1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
96 Acton, 515 U.S. at 665.
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313.
98 Id. at 321.
99 See Smiley, supra note 11, at 824.
100 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309; see Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77.
101 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Dery, supra note 11, at 75; Buffaloe, supra note 11, at 530-31;
Smiley, supra note 11, at 812-13; see also Ross H. Parr, Note, Suspicionless Drug
Testing and Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme Court Making the Right Decisions?,
7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 273 (1998) (submitting that the Acton decision is
inconsistent with the Court's previous case law). See generally LaFave, supra note
11, §§ 10.3(d), (e).
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Justice Blackmun, the originator of the doctrine, believed that
the doctrine should be limited;10 3 in fact he dissented in the next
two cases that adopted the special needs doctrine. 04 In both
instances, Blackmun argued that there was no special need
preventing the government from obtaining a warrant.10 5 Other
dissenting opinions by Supreme Court justices have been
scathing in their disparagement of the special needs doctrine
and its associated balancing test.
In T.L.O., Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the Court
had made a serious error by abandoning the probable cause
requirement. 106 Brennan further contended that the majority
opinion's balancing test "vastly overstate[d] the social costs that
a probable-cause standard entails" and failed to give adequate
weight to the individual's privacy interest.10 7 According to the
dissent, "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject
only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized
exceptions." 08 Brennan also argued that the purported search
must be significantly less intrusive than a full-scale- search and
that sufficient weight must be given to the privacy interests in
the balancing test for a warrantless search to be justified.109
Brennan defined a special need as one beyond the mere need to
apprehend lawbreakers. It should only be invoked in those
situations of exigency that would make "obtaining a warrant
either impossible or hopelessly infeasible."110 Brennan conceded
that this strictness might deter some searches, but maintained
this was the Fourth Amendment's very purpose.1 1 Brennan
103 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987) (Blaclmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a warrant should have been required); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 742 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expounding his viewpoint that there was
no demonstrated special need); see also Buffaloe, supra note 11, at 537 (contending
that Justice Blackmun did not intend "to create a category of special needs
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements").
105 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); O'Connor, 480 U.S.
at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
decision was not supported by precedent).
107 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Id- at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109 See id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111 See id. at 357 ("[Florcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a warrant
before engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from conducting some
searches that they would otherwise like to conduct.").
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claimed that the Court had "jettison[ed] the probable-cause
standard-the only standard that finds support in the text of the
Fourth Amendment"--for an amorphous balancing test.112
Justice Marshall's forceful dissent in Skinner argued that
the majority opinion was shortsighted and "allowed basic
constitutional rights to fall prey to [a] momentary
emergenc[y].""l3  He called the special needs rationale
"unprincipled and dangerous" and found that its exceptions had
"badly distorted" the precision of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 114 Marshall would have allowed a warrantless
search without a showing of individualized suspicion only in
cases where the search was routine, fleeting, and
nonintrusive.1 5
Marshall skillfully pointed out that even if the collection of
the urine samples was reasonable under an exigency rationale,
the same is not true for the actual testing of the samples." 6
Since the urine samples would not spoil, there was ample time to
obtain "a warrant authorizing, where appropriate, chemical
analysis of the extracted fluids."" 7
Marshall's argument also emphasized that the intrusion on
privacy was more severe than the majority had indicated. 118 He
asserted that the Court had trivialized the intrusiveness of the
searches." 9 Marshall noted that the Court had previously
characterized both a limited search of a person's outer clothing'20
and a scraping of a suspect's fingernails' 21  as
"severe... intrusions upon cherished personal security."22  He
further explained that compelling a person to produce a urine
sample on demand was a deep intrusion on "privacy and bodily
112 Id. at 357-58.
113 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the "war" on drugs provides no justification for
reducing the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment).
114 Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 638 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that other Supreme
Court cases have allowed warrantless searches only under these conditions).
116 See id. at 642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 643 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 636 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding the majority's
characterization "startling").
119 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
121 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973).
122 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 24-25).
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integrity." m3
Marshall also argued that even under the majority's
balancing test, he would have come to a different conclusion.124
In his opinion, "[t]he benefits of suspicionless... urine testing
are far outstripped by the costs imposed on personal liberty by
such sweeping searches. " 125 Compared to the substantial
invasion of privacy interests, Marshall contended that the
government's interest was not as great as the majority
concluded. 2 6 He derided the government's argument that drug
testing would deter employees from using drugs as "simply
implausible."127 Marshall argued that since the testing only
occurred after a major train accident, "if the risk of serious
personal injury does not deter their use of these substances, it
seems highly unlikely that the additional threat of loss of
employment would have any effect on their behavior."12s
Marshall, in a similar vein as Brennan's T.L.O. dissent,
pointed out that invalidating the FRA's testing policy might
"hinder the [glovernment's attempts to make rail transit as safe
as humanly possible. But, constitutional rights have their
consequences, and one is that efforts to maximize the public
welfare, no matter how well intentioned, must always be
pursued within constitutional boundaries." 129
In Von Raab, Justice Scalia's dissent focused on the lack of
any "real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine
testing of Customs Service employees." 130 According to Scalia,
the Court's earlier approval of a special need was based upon
"well-known or well-demonstrated evils."131 Scalia's argument
demonstrates his belief that any use of the special needs doctrine
SId. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that drawing blood, or
demanding a urine sample, is no less intrusive then the searches in Terry and
Cupp).
M See id. at 650 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Dodson, supra note 15, at
274 ("What the balancing test amounts to is how the Justices feel about a particular
law.").
n5 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 650.
126 See id. at 652-54.
127 Id. at 653.
n8 Id.
129 Id. at 650.
130 Natl Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). By contrast, in Acton, Justice Scalia found "an immediate
crisis... of much greater proportions than existed in Von Raab." Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
131 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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should be limited to targeted groups against whom the use of the
doctrine makes sense. 32 Notably, Scalia characterized urine
testing as a "type of search particularly destructive of privacy
and offensive to personal dignity."133
In Justice O'Connor's Acton dissent, she argued that the
majority's approval of a broad-based search of every student
athlete was a "greater threat to liberty" than a suspicion-based
search of individual athletes. 34 She argued that a suspicionless
policy should only be approved when it was "clear that a
suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual." 135 In her view, if
"an individualized suspicion requirement would not place the
government's objective in jeopardy", then the Court should
require individualized suspicion. 36 O'Connor reasoned that the
school district had already demonstrated it could reasonably
identify students who were using drugs, therefore, the district
would not be hampered by an individualized suspicion
requirement in its quest to deter drug use. 137
Scholars have also objected to the special needs doctrine.
One commentator described the special needs doctrine as a
"judicial rubber stamp of approval for randomized drug-testing
programs."138 According to this critic, the courts favor the
government's interests and inadequately account for the privacy
interests of the individual when conducting the balancing test.139
Another scholar called the special needs doctrine a "failed
experiment" that could potentially validate searches in many
other contexts. 140 This scholar argued that the special needs
doctrine "has failed to provide courts with a coherent basis on
132 See id. at 685-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how the decision could
have been limited to "employees assigned specifically to drug interdiction duties").
133 Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia wrote the majority opinion inActon
where he portrayed similar urine testing as a negligible infringement of privacy
interests. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
134 Acton, 515 U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 667-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137 See id. at 679-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that a "suspicion-
based testing [program] ... would have gone a long way toward solving Vernonia's
school drug problem while preserving the Fourth Amendment rights of" the
students).
138 Dodson, supra note 15, at 276.
139 See id. at 276-77.
140 Smiley, supra note 11, at 836-37 (indicating that the special needs decisions
"have the potential to validate government intrusions in many other aspects of our
lives").
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which to render search and seizure decisions."141
Another commentator's criticism of the special needs
exception is that it has turned "the warrant preference rule on
its head."142 According to this commentator, the balancing test
does not "adequately safeguard the rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment."143 Still another scholar suggests that the
courts have used the doctrine to justify "greater intrusions into
an individual's zone of privacy."144 Other critics of the special
needs doctrine have complained that it is "arbitrary, and ad-
hoc,"145 and provides an "inadequate guide" to courts in deciding
future cases.146
II. THE EARLS DECISION
The Tecumseh school district in Oklahoma adopted a drug
testing policy that required drug testing of all students who
participated in any extracurricular activity, including such
activities as academic teams, Future Farmers of America, band,
and vocal choir.147 Prior to participating in an activity, each
student was required to sign a written consent agreeing to
submit to random drug testing.148 The test was designed to
detect the presence of amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, and
141 Id. at 835 (declaring that "different courts have reached completely opposite
outcomes when applying special needs," and therefore a conclusive interpretation of
the doctrine is warranted).
142 Buffaloe, supra note 11, at 530-31 (arguing that as a result of the special
needs cases, the warrant preference rule only accounts for a "portion of government
searches conducted").
143 Id. at 551 (criticizing the balancing test as one that is "malleable and
unprincipled," and which "inevitably results in a decision upholding the search in
question").
144 Michael Polloway, Comment, Does the Fourth Amendment Prohibit
Suspicionless Searches-Or Do Individual Rights Succumb to the Government's "So-
Called" Special Needs?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 143, 182 (1999) (claiming that
the Supreme Court engages in circular reasoning whereby "the more the
government intrudes [on privacy], the less privacy we expect; thereby giving the
government more authority to intrude").
145 Logan, supra note 11, at 447-48 (agreeing with other critics that the
doctrine leads to "inconsistent results... and a dearth of guidance to lower courts
[in] applying" the special needs standards).
146 Benjamin Gerald Dusing, Note, Constitutional Standards for Suspicionless
Student Drug Testing: A Moving Target, 88 KY. L.J. 687, 713-716 (2000) (discussing
how Acton has not helped in deciding other suspicionless drug test cases).
147 See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001).
148 See id.
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opiates in a student's urine. 49 The testing procedure required a
student to go to a restroom with a faculty member who would
stand outside the closed restroom stall as the student urinated
into a vial. 150 The monitor would then pour the contents of the
vial into two bottles.' 51 Together, the monitor and the student
would seal the bottles. 52 The student would also fill out a form,
which would be submitted to the drug testing lab, listing any
medications legally prescribed for the student. 153 Two students,
one a member of the marching band and academic team, the
other a member of the academic team, challenged the drug
testing policy.154
The Earls court explained that the analysis of this case was
determined by the nature of the Fourth Amendment right as it
applies to schoolchildren. 155 The court declared that students'
Fourth Amendment rights are different from those of adults and
are determined by considering "what is appropriate for children
in school."156  The Earls court ultimately accepted Acton's
proposition that special needs exist in the school environment. 57
The majority, however, recognized another Tenth Circuit
decision that interpreted Chandler as requiring courts to first
inquire "whether the government has established the existence
of a special need before proceeding to any balancing of
government and private interests."58 Nonetheless, the court
chose to ignore its own precedent and used the Acton decision as
the primary guide for its analysis. 59 The court also indicated,
however, that it would have found that a special need existed
149 See id. The tests also detected the presence of barbiturates and
benzodiazepines. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1268.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 1268-69 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acten, 515 U.S. 646, 663
(1995)).
157 See id. at 1270.
158 Id. at 1269 (citing 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics v. Albuquerque,
156 F.3d 1068, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998)). 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics
involved a drug testing program instituted by the city that required certain city
employees to undergo a substance abuse test. See id. at 1071. In that case, the
Tenth Circuit held that before a court undergoes a balancing test it must determine
whether there is a special need. See id. at 1269.
159 See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1270.
[Vol.75:693
SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
even under a Chandler analysis.160
In evaluating the nature of the students' privacy interest the
court concluded that, like the athletes in Acton, "participants in
other extracurricular activities have a somewhat lesser privacy
expectation than other students.' 61 The court discounted any
difference in the level of "communal undress" between athletes
and participants in extracurricular activities, declining to give it
"much weight" in its analysis.162 The court reasoned that it was
more significant that certain aspects of participating in
extracurricular activities legitimately lowered a student's
expectation of privacy. 63 The Earls court explained that since
the students voluntarily agreed to "follow the directives and
adhere to the rules set out by the director of the activity", their
privacy expectations were lowered.'>
Earls dispensed with the character of the privacy intrusion
issue in one short paragraph' 65 In the court's opinion, the case
was squarely within the Acton fact pattern, and therefore, the
invasion of privacy was insignificant.166 Thus, the first two
prongs of the Acton test were satisfied.
The third prong of the Acton test, however, was not
satisfied.167 The court held that the nature and immediacy of the
drug testing policy were not sufficient to outweigh the student's
privacy interest.168  Primarily, the court questioned the
immediacy of the need for a drug testing program. 169 The court
noted the "paucity of evidence of an actual drug abuse problem
among those subject to the [p]olicy."170 Without a drug abuse
160 See id. at 1270 n.4 (reasoning that a potential drug abuse problem would be
sufficient to demonstrate a special need).
161 Id. at 1276.
162 Id. at 1275.
163 See id. at 1275-76. The court also remarked, however, that it did "not
believe that voluntary participation in an activity, without more, should reduce a
student's expectation of privacy in his or her body." Id. at 1276.
164 Id.
16 See id.
166 Id.
16 See id.
168 See id. at 1276-78.
169 See id. at 1277.
170 Id. After detailing the evidence of drug use in the school district, the court
concluded that such evidence was minimal. See id. at 1272-74. For the 1999-2000
school year only one student, out of 241, had tested positive for drug use. Id. at
1273.
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problem, the efficacy of the drug testing policy was doubtful. 171
The court implied that the government's interest in Earls
was not as important as the government interest that existed in
Acton.172  The court acknowledged that deterring drug use
among student athletes is important due to the particular
dangers such drug use causes. 173 It was difficult, however, for
the court to imagine how drug-abusing participants in the vocal
choir were in any more physical danger than the drug-abusing
non-participating students. 174 The court also identified students
not covered by the policy who were more appropriate candidates
for drug testing than the identified extracurricular
participants 7 5 The court ultimately concluded that the school
district's policy too often tested the wrong students.17 6
The court considered an alternative rationale for the drug
testing program-namely, that the tests were needed because
extracurricular students were subject to less supervision than
students in classrooms.177 Again, the Earls court discounted this
argument, stating there was an imperfect match between the
need to test and the group tested.178
After concluding that the third prong was unsatisfied,
thereby rendering the policy unconstitutional, the Earls court
stated:
[A]ny [school] district seeking to impose a random suspicionless
drug testing policy as a condition to participation in a school
activity must demonstrate that there is some identifiable drug
abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to
the testing, such that testing that group of students will
actually redress its drug problem.' 7 9
171 See id. at 1277.
172 See id. at 1276-77 (comparing the risk of physical harm to extracurricular
participants with the risk of physical harm to student athletes).
173 See id. at 1276.
174 See id. at 1277.
175 See id. (specifying that students working with shop equipment or in school
laboratories are involved in activities that could be considered dangerous).
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. (stating that there are students who are not subject to the policy who
also have little or no supervision, including students involved in other student
organizations).
179 Id. at 1278. The court, however, did not want to state a bright line rule
which would quantify the minimum level of drug usage sufficient for a school
district to "demonstrate" an identifiable drug abuse problem. Id.
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A. Criticism of the Earls Analysis
The Earls court's decision to virtually ignore Chandler and
base its analysis on Acton's three part test is misguided. Since,
the Chandler case was decided after Acton, it represents the
current Supreme Court's philosophy on the special needs
doctrine. 80 According to tenets of legal jurisprudence, a more
recent decision should shape a court's analysis on a particular
area of law.' 8 ' The Chandler decision indicates that the alleged
special need has to be "substantial-important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion."18 2 Chandler indicated
that a demonstrated problem of drug abuse was not a necessary
prerequisite for a special need claim, but evidence of drug usage
would bolster any argument that a drug testing program was
warranted and appropriate. 183 Chandler distinguished the only
case in which a drug testing program was validated without a
prior demonstration of a drug abuse problem. 8 4 Arguably, the
Court is indicating that it would take an extreme case to
override its preference for a prior demonstration of a drug abuse
problem before finding the required substantial special need.
As the Earls court noted, the evidence of actual drug usage
in the Tecumseh school district was minimal, and possibly non-
existent among the target group, therefore, a special need did
not exist. 85 Once a court determines the government cannot
establish a special need, it should not proceed to apply the
balancing test 86 This was confirmed by the Chandler decision,
180 As the Ferguson case was decided on the same day as Earls, the Earls court
would not be expected to have used that case in its analysis. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
181 See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1065-66 (7th
Cir. 2000) (explaining how stare decisis and precedent influence a court's decision);
Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 89-98
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
182 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
183 See id. at 319.
184 See id. at 320-21 (negating the government's argument that the Von Raab
decision should lead the Court to conclude that a pre-existing drug problem was not
a requirement). The Court, however, did not overrule Von Raab, but limited it to its
unique facts. See id. at 321.
185 See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 2001) (detailing
the level of drug usage among the student population).
186 See 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068,
1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
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which states that without a special need a court should
discontinue its inquiry.8 7 Alternatively, as O'Connor's dissent in
Acton demonstrates, the Earls court could have held that a
suspicion-based program would have sufficed to meet the
government's interest. 88
B. How the Earls Court Failed to Consider Other Facts in its
Application of the Acton Three Part Test.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Earls decision to use the
Acton three part test was correct, the court's analysis lacked
clarity and failed to consider other facts that would have
strengthened its eventual decision.
Students do not "shed their constitutional rights... at the
schoolhouse gate."18 9 Consequently, the Fourth Amendment
does protect schoolchildren. 190 The Earls court unfortunately
repeated and adopted the Supreme Court's statement that
students within the school environment "have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally."191 A closer examination of the context in which the
Supreme Court announced this proposition, however, reveals
that both the Supreme Court and the Earls court have
subsequently misused this statement.
Justice Powell wrote the statement in his concurring opinion
in T.L.O.;192 therefore, it does not represent the holding of the
Court. Powell reasoned that due to the close association between
students and their teachers, it was "unrealistic to think that
students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the
population generally." 93 Powell conceded, "But for purposes of
deciding this case, I can assume that children in school-no less
than adults-have privacy interests that society is prepared to
187 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
188 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 679-80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). By applying O'Connor's logic, the school district should be
able to identify drug abusing students.
189 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(applying the First Amendment).
190 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332-36 (1985) (discussing how the
Fourth Amendment apples in the school context). See generally LAFAVE, supra note
11, § 10.11 (detailing the law of search and seizures in the context of students).
191 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Acton,
515 U.S. at 657).
192 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
193 Id.
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recognize as legitimate."194  This indicates that his conclusion
that students have a lessened privacy expectation should be
limited to the facts of T.L.O. In T.L.O. the search was conducted
to discover evidence of a student's violation of a school rule.195
Students know that they are expected to follow the rules and
regulations of the school district.196 In this context, it may be
reasonable to assume that a student would have a lesser
expectation of privacy. A student, however, would not expect
their privacy interests to be any different when it comes to their
bodily functions.197 Although "children are compelled to attend
school, ... nothing suggests that they lose their right to privacy
in their excretory functions when they do so."198 The student has
no reason to believe he is expected to urinate on demand in the
presence of a teacher.199  Additionally, evidence exists that
forcing students to urinate on demand has caused students to
suffer from stress. 200 The Earls court should have distinguished
the expected privacy interests of students in the context of
obeying school rules and regulations versus the expected privacy
interests of students performing excretory functions.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the drug testing in
194 Id. (emphasis added).
195 See id. at 328 (noting that the student was accused of smoking in the
school's bathroom, a violation of the schoors rules and regulations).
196 See Paul T. Hayden, Applying Client-Lawyer Models in Legal Education, 21
LEGAL STUD. F. 301, 314-15 (1997); see also Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963
P.2d 1095, 1106-07 (Colo. 1998) (noting that students have numerous rules to
follow).
197 See Respondent's Brief at 16, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (No. 94-590) (stating that "nothing in their experience in the
classroom... prepares them for the schoors... demand to produce urine for
inspection").
198 Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
199 See Respondent's Brief at 27, Acton (No. 94-590) (explaining that children
expect to urinate in seclusion).
200 See Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1108 (stating that one student was too embarrassed
to urinate on demand); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833,
843 (N.D. Ind. 1988), affd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (indicating that some
athletes suffered from so much stress "that they were unable to void the[ir] bladder
for up to two or three hours"); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968)
(explaining that "in our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less
absolute privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are
experienced as extremely distressing, as detracting from one's dignity and self-
esteem"); see also Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 n.38 (W.D. Okla.
2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (detailing the statements of the
students whose complaints ranged from embarrassing to degrading).
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Acton was indistinguishable from the ordinary use of a restroom
is dubious.201 In a case similar to Earls, the Colorado Supreme
Court disagreed and indicated, "We question the... conclusion
that the ordinary use of the school's restrooms was
indistinguishable from the drug testing that took place here."20 2
Forcing a student to urinate inside a vial for the purposes of a
drug test cannot be equated to the ordinary use of a public
restroom. 203 "Ordinarily, a student urinates simply because the
body requires it, not because a school district insists that the
student provide a urine sample on demand in order for the
school district to search it for the presence of drugs." 20 4
The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit should take
notice of these countervailing opinions and conclude that in the
area of urine testing, a student's privacy interests are no less
than any other citizen's under the Fourth Amendment.
The Earls court also held that, similar to the athletes in
Acton, extracurricular participants have a reduced expectation of
privacy compared to the general student population.20 5 The
Acton court posited that student athletes have an even lesser
expectation of privacy than other students.20 6 Acton came to this
conclusion on the basis of how the athletes dressed and showered
in the locker room, and to a lesser degree on their voluntary
participation in the athletic activity.207 The Supreme Court's
linguistic choice to follow its declaration that "[1legitimate
privacy expectations are even less with regard to student
athletes" with the statement that [s]chool sports are not for the
bashful," indicates that the communal dressing and showering of
athletes is the primary reason for its conclusion. 208 The Supreme
Court emphasized that the reason for the lower privacy
expectation for student athletes was the state of "communal
201 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
202 Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1108.
203 See id.
204 Id.
205 See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276; see also Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp.,
212 F.3d 1052, 1063 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that students who participate in
extracurricular activities have a greater expectation of privacy than athletes, but a
lesser expectation of privacy than the general student population).
206 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
207 See id. (suggesting that because athletes have to undergo physical
examinations and follow the coach's directions there is an analogy between student
athletes and employees in highly regulated industries).
208 Id.
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undress" they have to endure.209 Other courts have agreed and
have indicated that this is a significant factor. 210 In contrast, for
the most part, students involved in extracurricular activities do
not have to undress in front of others or shower together.211 The
Earls court's determination to overlook this factor is not in
conformity with the Supreme Court's analysis.
Similarly, the focus of the Earls court on the voluntary
nature of extracurricular activities is flawed. The Acton
language that volunteering is an "additional respect" indicates
that this is a secondary factor, which by itself cannot support a
lesser privacy expectation among the selected group of
students.212 Moreover, even if the Earls court is correct that the
voluntary nature of an activity can serve as the basis for a
student's reduced expectation of privacy, the court overstates the
reason it uses, while conveniently ignoring other facts that
would challenge its conclusion. A Pennsylvania court agrees
that "a student's privacy interests are no less than any other
student's just by participating in any extracurricular activity."213
The Earls court admitted that the aspects of participating in
extracurricular activities that are in common with the athletes
involved in Acton include "follow[ing] the directives and
adher[ing] to the rules set out by the... director of the
activity."214 The Earls court also agreed that this only constrains
their personal freedom "in some small way."215 It seems odd that
a student who follows the rules has somehow now agreed to a
lesser privacy 'expectation. Moreover, every student, not just
students who volunteer for activities, must follow numerous
rules and directives set forth by their teachers. 216 This leads
209 See id. (assuming that all student athletes have to dress and undress in a
locker room situation similar to the one in existence in Acton).
210 See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063; Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d
415, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1998); Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d
919, 929 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1107
(Colo. 1998).
211 See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001); Lopez, 963
P.2d at 1107.
212 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
213 Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d. 652, 660 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000).
214 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276. The Earls court did point out that unlike the
athletes in Acton, the extracurricular students did not need to obtain pre-
participation physicals or insurance. Id.
215 Id
216 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 377 n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
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circuitously to the absurd conclusion that all students must have
an even lesser privacy expectation than the general student.
Furthermore, the Earls court agrees that it would be doubtful
that all students could be subjected to a drug testing program.217
Furthermore, there is a convincing argument that
participation in extracurricular activities is not really a
voluntary choice. The Supreme Court has stated that
participating in extracurricular activities is part of a "complete
educational experience."218  The Earls court conceded that
extracurricular "participation has become an integral part of the
educational experience for most students."219 For high school
students that apply to colleges and universities, their
participation in extracurricular activities is a key component of
their chances for being selected to attend their preferred
college. 220 The student would thus be presented with a choice
between subjecting themselves to a degrading urine test or not
participating in the extracurricular activity. For all the reasons
presented above, the Earls court should have concluded that the
Tecumseh policy failed the first prong of the Acton test.
The Tenth Circuit described the character of the intrusion
involved in Earls as virtually identical to the testing process in
Acton.221 One important aspect of the Acton test, however, is not
present in Earls. In Acton, an initial test that indicates the
presence of drugs was followed by a second test to confirm the
result.222 This would at least ninimize the chances of a "false
concurring and dissenting) (listing some of the rules that all students may be
required to follow); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text.
217 See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278 (speculating that the Supreme Court would not
approve of a drug testing policy that tested all students).
218 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000).
219 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276.
220 See Barb Berggoetz, Movement to Dump the SAT Isn't Swaying State's
Colleges, THE INDIANAPOLIs STAR, Mar. 28, 2001, at Al (indicating that
extracurricular activities are a factor for more competitive schools in deciding
whether to admit a student); Michael Ollove, Picking Between Students on a Whim
and a Prayer; Educated Guesses Are Big Part of Admissions, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
Mar. 4, 2001, at 1A (stating extracurricular activities help colleges to distinguish
among its candidates); Claudia Wallis, -Special Report: How to Make a Better
Student, Their Eight Secrets of Success, TIME, Oct. 19, 1998, at 80 (observing that
competitive colleges use participation in extracurricular activities as a sign of
genuine commitment).
221 See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276.
222 See id. at 1267-68 (according to the facts of the case only one drug test is
undertaken); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650-51 (1995)
(indicating that a positive test is followed by a secondary confirming test).
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positive." Urine tests can yield inaccurate results as often as
sixty percent of the time.223 False positives can arise from such
innocent activities as the use of medications.224 Although, in
Earls, the school district claimed that its drug tests were 99.4%
accurate, this would still suggest that of every 1000 students
tested, six would be unfairly judged as drug users. Although this
is a small number, to paraphrase a famous quote, it is better to
free ten drug users than incorrectly accuse one who is
innocent.225 It would be unconscionable to brand a student as a
drug abuser when they are innocent of any wrongdoing. In
addition to the false positives, the test's susceptibility to cheating
renders it ill designed to identify the chronic drug user.226 Since
there are a variety of ways for drug users to cheat to obtain a
clean result, the efficiency of urine drug testing is questionable.
Additionally, the district should have to justify a warrantless
search for both the collection and testing of the urine
specimens. 227 The Supreme Court's depiction of the character of
the intrusion in Acton, and by implication in Earls, is one that
should be challenged. The character of the intrusion involved in
Earls is a serious one and likely does not meet the second prong
of the Acton test.
The Earls court does state persuasive reasons why the third
prong of the Acton test is not met. The court could have added to
its opinion that a school district should not attempt to divide the
student population into broad categories and then conduct drug
testing on a category-by-category basis. This would eventually
result in drug testing for all but the most uninvolved and
isolated students.228 The court should have stated a bright line
223 JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 130 (1997).
224 See id. at 132. False positives can also arise from the ingestion of certain
foods. Id.
See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("[It is better that ten
guilty persons go free than that one innocent person is convicted.") (citing WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358).
226 See New Trade Boom to Cheat Drug Tests at Work, THE SOUTHLAND TIMES
(New Zealand), May 2, 2000, at 7; Christopher Reed, Beware: That Bagel Could Get
You Fired; Tests That Mistake Food For Drugs Are Terrifying US Workers, THE
OBSERVER, Dec. 12, 1999, at 16; Amy Shipley, Drug Tests, Troubling Results; IOC's
System is Plagued by False Positives in Addition to Cheating, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 23, 1999, at D1 (illustrating how athletes can perform activities that
will result in inaccurate results). '
27 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
228 See Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 423 (7th Cir. 1998)
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rule that any expansion of drug testing beyond student athletes
is unconstitutional.
III. A BETTER SPECIAL NEEDS TEST
Since there is a difference in the federal courts of appeals, on
the issues presented in Earls, it would be wise for the Supreme
Court to clarify its position on this matter.229 The courts, and
particularly the Supreme Court, should state a bright-line rule
making suspicionless drug testing of students participating in
extracurricular activities unconstitutional. A vast number of
students participate in extracurricular activities.230 If the courts
allow the special needs doctrine to apply to this population, it is
only one small step to making all students subjected to urine
drug testing. Consequently, despite the ills of a broad-based
search, and the warnings of the Acton Court, the Fourth
Amendment would have virtually no meaning or application to
the schoolchildren of America.
This Comment suggests that the Court should be firm in its
general rule that a warrant, or some level of suspicion, is
required before a search can be conducted by the government.
Unfortunately, the lower courts have misused the special needs
doctrine and have validated invasive drug testing in many
situations. 231 The special needs doctrine by its very definition
states that it should only be applied in situations where
obtaining a warrant or requiring reasonable suspicion is
"impracticable."232  The Court has added the additional
requirement that the special need be substantial.23 3  The
Supreme Court should give the lower courts a clear indication of
exactly when the special needs doctrine is applicable.
The special needs doctrine should be reworked to state that
(warning against the possibility that school districts will divide students into broad
categories so that eventually virtually all students will be subject to the drug testing
policy).
229 See supra note 7.
230 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 1995, at http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubsce/c9543a01.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2002).
231 See Dodson, supra note 15, at 282 (listing some of the situations in which
courts have allowed drug testing programs); Smiley, supra note 11, at 828-30
(discussing some of the cases from the Seventh Circuit that have validated drug
testing programs on the basis of the special needs doctrine).
232 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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it would only apply to situations where the government interest
is compelling and where the general public safety is
substantially threatened by a well-documented and genuine
danger. Furthermore, this danger should be one that would
cause great harm to a large number of the population. This
would preserve the special needs doctrine to situations such as
nuclear power plants234 and airport safety checks.235 This new
standard would oblige the Court to overturn the Acton decision,
and quite possibly, the Von Raab and Skinner decisions as well.
CONCLUSION
The special needs doctrine is a limited exception to the
requirement that the government obtain a warrant or
demonstrate some level of suspicion before conducting a search.
The Supreme Court has held that the government has a special
need to mandate suspicionless drug testing of student athletes.
The Earls decision wisely refused to extend the special needs
doctrine to students participating in extracurricular activities.
The Tenth Circuit, however, was too timid in its approach and
should have announced a bright-line rule prohibiting a school
district from adopting a urine drug testing program for students
who participate in extracurricular activities as violative of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the special needs doctrine needs to
be restated so that it provides a more coherent guideline for the
judicial system.
234 See Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1992).
235 See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1980).
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